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LOOKING FOR A BETTER WAY: THE SANCTION
LAWS OF KEY U.S. ALLIES
BARRY E. CARTER*
I. INTRODUCTION
When it comes to imposing economic sanctions for for-
eign policy purposes, the Chief Executives of the United
Kingdom, West Germany, andJapan have broad authority to
control their respective countries' exports, imports, and pri-
vate financial transactions. This authority differs from that
of the U.S. President who, under present U.S. law, has wide
discretion to cut off almost all exports, but has only limited
control over imports and over foreign loans by private U.S.
banks.' This is in the absence of a declared national emer-
gency, where the President has sweeping powers.2
The more extensive authority possessed by the leaders
of major U.S. allies is especially noteworthy because these
countries are parliamentary democracies, which should en-
able their Chief Executives to more easily push new laws
through their legislatures during a foreign policy dispute or
minor crisis. In contrast, one or both houses of the U.S.
Congress often is controlled by the opposition party which
might balk at or at least slow a legislative initiative of the
President.
Many reasons, including historical and cultural ones, as
well as existing institutional arrangements, help to explain
these differences. There is, however, no comprehensive
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
The Author wishes to thank Timothy Dickinson and Arthur Downey for
their comments, Ian Fagelson for his comments and research of British
law, and Marian Hagler and Ines Radmilovic for their research assistance.
I. The U.S. laws will be discussed in Carter, International Economic
Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard C*S. Regime, forthcoming in 75 CAUiF. L.
REV. (1987) and will be treated more comprehensively in B. CARTER, IN-
TERNATIONAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS: IMPROVING THE HAPHAZARD U.S. RE-
GIME, to be published by Cambridge University Press in 1988.
2. E.g., Giraudo, Waging Economic Wrnfare: The Sanctions Power U nder Ihe
Constitution, 19 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 935 (1987) (elsewhere in this is-
sue).
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comparative study of the various countries' laws on sanc-
tions.
Although such an analysis is beyond the scope of this
Article, a brief study of sanction laws in the United Kingdom,
West Germany, the European Community, and Japan3 un-
derscores the possibility of the United States adopting a dif-
ferent approach. 4 Among the issues addressed in this Article
are the relative difficulty in imposing import and private
credit controls versus export controls, the protections ac-
corded individual businesses, and the relations between the
governments of U.S. allies and their private international
banks.
II. SANCTIONS BY U.S. ALLIES
A. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the Executive has very broad
authority to impose economic sanctions for foreign policy
purposes. Three statutes appear central to the British Cabi-
net's ability to impose sanctions without further legislation.
One regulates the export and import of goods; the other two
govern financial transactions.
The Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act
of 1939 grants the Secretary of State broad authority to pro-
3. A brief look at another U.S. ally, Australia, suggests that the Prime
Minister there has broad powers to prohibit imports as well as exports
under the Customs Law of 1901. In the past, Australia has imposed eco-
nomic sanctions against Rhodesia, Iran, the Soviet Union, North Vietnam,
France, Argentina, and South Africa. Existing contracts usually seem to be
honored, with the controls only applying to future transactions. G.
Herndon, Import and Export Controls as Economic Sanctions: A Compar-
ison of the American and Australian Approaches (1986) (unpublished pa-
per on file at Georgetown University Law Center).
4. These observations may also encourage further, much-needed
comparative studies. An excellent example is J. JACKSON, J.V. Louis & M.
MATSUSHITA, IMPLEMENTING THE TOKYO ROUND (1984), a comparative
analysis of how U.S., European Economic Community, and Japanese legal
systems affect the development of international agreements on economic
matters, with a focus on the trade agreements reached in the 1970s at
GATT's Tokyo Round of negotiations. Another excellent, though more
limited, example is Hein, Economic Embargoes and Individual Rights I "nder Ger-
man Law, 15 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 401 (1983). a comparison of West
German and U.S. laws on economic sanctions.
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hibit the export or import of any good for any reason.-
Although designed as a temporary wartime measure, it re-
mains in active use today.6 This statute was used as part of
the United Kingdom's effort to ban exports to Iran in 1980
and to ban trade with Southern Rhodesia in 1965. 7
The second statute is the Exchange Control Law of
1947, which gives the Treasury broad power to restrict or
prohibit transactions in foreign currency.8 This law, how-
ever, apparently has been used only once to impose eco-
nomic sanctions: for two months in 1979 to continue sanc-
tions against Southern Rhodesia when those against other
countries were lifted. 9
The third statute, the Emergency Laws Act of 1964, con-
5. 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 69. Section 1(1) provides: "The Board of Trade
may by order make such provisions as the Board think expedient for
prohibiting or regulating... the importation into, or exportation from,
the United Kingdom... of all goods or goods of any specified descrip-
tion." See also C. SCHMrITrHOFF, THE EXPORT TRADE: A MANUAL OF LAW
AND PRACTICE 305 (1950).
6. Import, Export and Customs Powers (Defence) Act of 1939, 2 & 3
Geo. 6, ch. 69, § 9(3). The Act today provides the legal authority for Brit-
ish import and export licensing requirements. See Import of Goods (Con-
trol) Order, Stat. Inst. No. 23 (1954) (prohibiting the importation of all
unlicensed goods into the United Kingdom); Export of Goods (Control)
Order, Stat. Inst. No. 849 (1985) (prohibiting the export of certain goods
from the United Kingdom unless they are licensed). The latter order also
controls the export of strategic goods and technology to Communist
countries. Id. arts. iv, vii.
The statute was recently upheld against a challenge as to whcther it
authorized the Secretary of State to impose Commonwealth import prefer-
ences protecting the Caribbean producers and shippers of bananas. Re-
gina v. Secretary of St. for Trade ex parte Chris Int'l Foods Ltd., 1983
T.L.R. 528 (Q.B.). The court noted that the Secretary of State's powers
under § 1 were not "unfettered," but had to be exercised "reasonably and
not arbitrarily." Id.
7. See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text (concerning the use of
country-specific legislation).
8. 10 & I1 Geo. 6, ch. 14.
9. All exchange controls, except those regarding Southern Rhodesia.
were abolished in October 1979. See Stat. Inst. Nos. 1331-37 (1979). The
Southern Rhodesia controls were finally lifted in December, when a gen-
eral exemption was issued. The Exchange Control (General Exemption)
Order, Stat. Inst. No. 1660 (1979); see also The Control of Gold and Treas-
ury Bills (Southern Rhodesia) (Revocation) Directions, Stat. Inst. No.
1661 (1979). The last item lifted exchange bans ordered under the Emer-
gency Laws (Re-Enactment and Repeals) Act. 1964, ch. 60.
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trols financial transactions that the Treasury believes are "to
the detriment of the economic position of the United King-
dom."' 0 The Treasury used this statute in 1982 to freeze all
Argentine assets in British banks during the Falklands cri-
sis 1I and in 1965 to prohibit the transfer of gold and other
securities to Southern Rhodesia.' 2
Although the British Cabinet has this broad statutory
authority, it often seeks specific authority from Parliament to
respond to a particular crisis. The Cabinet sought such au-
thority in acting against IranI3 and Southern Rhodesia, 14 but
not Argentina. Even though country-specific legislation
might be requested in order to clarify ambiguities in the gen-
eral laws, the request also appears to be a vehicle for ob-
taining a demonstration of domestic political support.' 5
10. Emergency Laws (Re-Enactment Repeals) AC, 1964, § 2(1).
11. Control of Gold, Securities, Payments and Credits (Argentine Re-
public) Directions, Stat. Inst. No. 512 (1982), repealed by Stat. Inst. No.
1296 (1982); see Amine, Economic Sanctions: Falkland Islands (Malvinas), 23
HARV. INT'L L.J. 404, 405 n.2 (1983).
12. Control of Gold and Treasury Bills (Southern Rhodesia) Direc-
tions, Stat. Inst. No. 1939 (1965), repealed by Control of Gold and Treasury
Bills (Southern Rhodesia) (Revocation) Directions, Stat. Inst. No. 1661
(1979).
13. The British Cabinet seemed reluctant to use general statutory au-
thority to impose sanctions on Iran without a specific mandate from Parlia-
ment. Orders issued under the Import/Export Act went only as far as
those authorized by the Iran (Temporary Powers) Act, 1980, ch. 28.
14. Orders against Southern Rhodesia under the Import/Export Act
were issued in conjunction with those issued under the United Nations
Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 45, § 1, and the Southern Rhodesia Act,
1965, ch. 76. Together, they effectively banned all exports from the
United Kingdom to Rhodesia and 95% of all imports, including oil. See G.
HUFBAUER & J. SCHOTrT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 409-10
(1985).
15. Another statute also appears to grant the Cabinet power to impose
sanctions, although it has not been used in this manner. Under the Trad-
ing with the Enemy Act, 1939, 2 & 3 Geo. 6, ch. 89, the Board of Trade
may label any country an "enemy," thereby rendering impermissible trade
with that country. This could be used to cut off all commercial transac-
tions with that country.
Ian Fagelson, an English solicitor at the Warner Cranston firm in
London, also writes: "It is generally believed that the Crown has, by vir-
tue of its prerogative, considerable non-statutory powers to regulate the
movement of goods and persons into and from the country and to take
other actions necessary to procure the safety of the Realm. However the
precise ambit of the Royal prerogative is unclear. Accordingly, in modern
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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The Cabinet has additional authority to impose sanc-
tions as a result of U.K. participation in multilateral organi-
zations. Under the United Nations Act, the U.K. Govern-
ment may take whatever steps are necessary to implement
Security Council regulations.' 6 Under the European Com-
munities Act, the Cabinet has the power to implement Euro-
pean Community legislation.' 7
These statutes enable the British Prime Minister and
Cabinet to impose comprehensive controls over exports, im-
ports, and private financial transactions for foreign policy
reasons.
B. Vest Germany
West Germany has a relatively simple legal framework
that differs from the U.S. method of regulating foreign com-
merce. The basic German statute on foreign commerce is
the Aussenwirtschaftsgesetz of 1961 (hereinafter AWG). 18
Though relatively short, the AWG governs all international
commercial transactions by West German residents, includ-
ing exports, imports, payments, and capital movements.' 9
As a result, many of the AWG's provisions apply across all of
these transactions. 20 To the extent that the West German
times it has been thought necessary to enact legislation specifically confer-
ring certains powers on the Crown." Letter from Ian B. Fagelson to
Arthur T. Downey at 1 (Sept. 25, 1986) [hereinafter Fagelson letter] (copy
on file at the Georgetown University Law Center).
16. United Nations Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 45, § 1.
17. European Communities Act, 1972, ch. 68, §§ 2(2), (4); see also infra
text accompanying notes 31-46 (about the European Community).
18. [1961] 1 Bundesgesetzblatt [BGBI] 481, as amended, [1980] 1 BGBI
1905 [hereinafter AWG].
19. Section 1(I) of the AWG defines foreign commerce as -[t]he ex-
change of goods, services, capital, payments and other economic valuables
with foreign economic areas as well as the exchange of foreign economic
valuables and gold if carried out by residents." AWG, supra note 18,
§ 1(1), transL in Hein, supra note 4, at 404 n.13.
20. Hein, supra note 4, at 422 ("[T]he German Executive's powers are
consolidated in one Statute establishing a uniform standard for the restric-
tion of different forms of foreign commerce.").
In addition to having direct statutory authority over private credit.
the German Government has developed a variety of effective instruments
for influencing the international behavior of German banks. For example.
the Government successfully prodded the banks to extend a DM 1.2 bil-
lion (over $600 million) loan to Poland during 1980. The Government
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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Executive has the authority to impose sanctions, his author-
ity is similar for exports, imports, and private credit transac-
tions. This contrasts with the present haphazard U.S. law in
this area.
In addition to providing the Executive with similar
power over different economic activities, the AWG provides
businesses with a number of protections not found in ex-
isting U.S. law, particularly U.S. export laws. For example, a
critical principle embodied in the AWG is that the freedom to
engage in commerce is an individual right.21 This principle
represents a dramatic change in the West German legal sys-
tem from that which existed prior to 1961. Under the prior
statute, which dates from the Occupation, foreign commerce
was prohibited and any exception required a government li-
cense.
22
Although the West German Executive is authorized to
restrict foreign commerce through regulations, the controls
must be imposed in specific ways and for specific purposes. 2
One important constraint is that West German courts "look
more closely into foreign commerce actions than do U.S.
courts." 24 Possibly even more important, existing contracts
are exempted from sanctions as much as possible, and sanc-
tions affecting existing contracts or the withdrawal of ex-
isting licenses "would generally require compensation." 25
did this by combining export credit guarantees with persuasion. J. SPIN-
DLER, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL CREDIT 30-34 (1984).
21. The AWG's first provision states that "[f]oreign commerce is free in
principle." AWG, supra note 18, § 1 (1), transl in Hein, supra note 4, at 404
n.14.
22. Hein, supra note 4, at 404-05. The theory underlying present U.S.
export law, that it is a privilege to export, not a right, is closer to the for-
mer German laws. See, e.g., Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470, 493
(1904) (upholding an import statute and stating that "no individual has a
vested right to trade with foreign nations"). This view is recognized in the
legislative history of the Export Administration Act. S. REP. No. 169, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. 3-4 (1979).
23. This authority is premised primarily on the existence of a threat to
national security, international peace, foreign policy, or the national econ-
omy. Hein, supra note 4, at 405.
24. Id. at 423; see also id. at 406 (German courts review executive actions
in the area of foreign policy more closely than do U.S. courts).
25. Id. at 423; see also id. at 415-22 (discussing the relationship between
individual rights and sanctions).
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C. The European Community
The European Community26 can limit the ability of its
members, such as the United Kingdom and West Germany,
to impose unilateral sanctions, and can impose sanctions it-
self against nonmember states. The laws of the European
Community are particularly restrictive regarding the imposi-
tion of sanctions between the twelve Member States. The
Treaty of Rome of the European Economic Community
(hereinafter EEC Treaty) prohibits export or import controls
and restrictions on the flow of private credit between the
Member States for foreign policy reasons.2 7
26. The European Community is technically three communities estab-
lished by separate treaties: the European Economic Community (hereinaf-
ter EEC) established under the Treaty of Rome, done Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity (hereinafter ECSC) established under the Treaty Instituting the
European Coal and Steel Community, done Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140; and the European Atomic Energy Community established under the
Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, done Mar.
25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167.
Present members of the European Community include Belgium, Den-
mark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.
There has been increasing integration among the three Communities.
For example, in 1965, a single Council and Commission were established.
See Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the
European Communities (Merger Treaty), Apr. 8, 1965, 4 I.L.M. 776.
More recently, in 1986, the Conference of the Representatives of the Gov-
ernments of the Member States adopted an act that included EEC Treaty
modifications concerning foreign policy coordination as well as commu-
nity institutions, monetary cooperation, research and technology, environ-
mental protection, and social policy. See Single European Act, done Feb. 17
& 28, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986). It has been sent to the twelve Member
States for their approval.
For an excellent general discussion of the European Community's
legal framework of international trade, see Louis, The European Economic
Community and the Implementation of the GA 7T Tokyo Round Results, inJ. JACK-
SON, J.V. Louis & M. MATsusHrrA, supra note 4, at 21.
27. EEC Treaty, supra note 26, arts. 9 (prohibition against customs du-
ties between Member States), 10 (free movement of goods), 30-37 (elimi-
nation of quantitative restrictions), 67-73 (movement of capital). The pro-
visions reflect the original intent of the Member States to integrate their
economies.
Member States, however, have imposed certain monetary controls in
times of domestic economic difficulties. For example, in 1983 the Mitter-
rand Government limited the amount of currency a French citizen could
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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The European Community apparently can also limit the
flexibility of its members in taking action against nonmem-
ber states. Consistent with the primary focus of the EEC
Treaty, the use of import controls is most restricted. A
Member State might nonetheless be allowed to impose im-
port controls against a nonmember country. The possibility
of indirect trade through another Member State, however,
makes any attempted unilateral import controls relatively in-
effective, depending on the cost of transshipment. For ex-
ample, the United Kingdom can ban the import of diamonds
from South Africa, 28 but it cannot prohibit the import of
diamonds from South Africa to the United Kingdom by way
of another Member State as long as the diamonds have
cleared customs in that Member State. 29
The laws of the European Community do not appear to
prohibit unilateral controls over exports to a third country
nor over private credit transactions with entities there. Some
questions, however, may be raised under the EEC Treaty
provisions regarding the "common commercial policy" and
under other provisions regarding consultation among the
Member States.30
The European Community itself can impose sanctions.
The Community has clear authority to restrict imports in
many situations, and some apparent authority to regulate ex-
take out of the country, including to a Member State. Articles 104 through
109 of the EEC Treaty allow Member States to implement certain actions
when "seriously threatened with difficulties as regards... [the] balance of
payments." Id. art. 108. However, the legal limits by the Community on a
Member State's actions are not always clear. See generally E. STEIN, P. HAY
& M. WAELBROECK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PER-
SPECTIVE (1976 & Supp. 1985).
28. See Fagelson letter, supra note 15, at 3.
29. EEC Treaty, supra note 26, art. 9(2). Article 10(1) of the EEC
Treaty provides that "Products coming from a third country shall be con-
sidered to be in free circulation in a Member State if the import formalities
have been complied with and any customs duties or charges having
equivalent effect which are payable have been levied in that Member State
30. See id. arts. 110-16 (common commercial policy), 224 (consulta-
tion); see also Single European Act, supra note 26, tit. III (provision on
Community cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy). Many see the
European Community as a political institution that does not have a clear
legal framework for all of its actions. See generally E. STEIN, P. HAY & M.
WAELBROECK, supra note 27.
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
[Vol. 19:865
SANCTIONS LAWS OF KEY US. ALLIES
ports and private credit. For example, the Community has
previously imposed sanctions against Rhodesia, Iran, the So-
viet Union, Argentina, and South Africa.3 1
In deciding whether to impose economic sanctions, the
Foreign Ministers of the Member States usually focus initial
discussions on what steps to take and also on the choice "be-
tween a true Community approach or a perhaps coordinated
but separate implementation" of measures.32 The exact
legal bases for imposing sanctions often are delineated at a
later time and sometimes even left vague in official docu-
ments of the Community.33 This approach partly reflects the
evolving growth of a supranational organization.
A review of the Community's laws and its past uses of
sanctions indicates, however, that it does have a strong legal
basis for imposing import controls. Article 113 of he EEC
Treaty, which provides for "implementing the common com-
mercial policy,"34 is used most often. When proposed sanc-
31. See infra text accompanying notes 37-44; see, e.g., Kuyper, Community
Sanctions Against Argentina: Lawfulness Under Community and International Law,
in EssAYS IN EUROPEAN LAW AND INTEGRATION 141 (D. O'Keeffe & H.
Schermers eds. 1982); 29 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 268) 1 (1986) (sanctions
on iron and steel products originating in South Africa); 29 Oj. EUR.
CoMM. (No. L 305) 11, 45 (1986) (sanctions against South Africa).
32. Kuyper, supra note 31, at 144.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44 (discussing the import ban
on certain South African iron and steel products).
The Council and the Commission can choose among different legal
vehicles to implement a measure. The choice between, say, issuing a regu-
lation or a directive has a substantive impact on how a measure is imple-
mented by the Member States. Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, supra note
26, provides for regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and
opinions. It reads in part:
A regulation shall have general application. It shall be bind-
ing in its entirety and directly applicable to all Member States.
A directive shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved.
upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave
to the national authorities the choice of form and methods.
A decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to
whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
Id.
34. Article 113(l) of the EEC Treaty, supra note 26, states that "the
common commercial policy shall be based on uniform principles, particu-
larly in regard to changes in tariff rates, the conclusion of tariff and trade
agreements, the achievement of uniformity in measures of liberalisation,
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tions do not fall under the common commercial policy, the
Member States can still consult with each other pursuant to
article 224 of the EEC Treaty and decide to implement sanc-
tions individually.3 5 Article 223 provides a specific basis for
sanctions involving "trade in arms, munitions, and war mate-
rial." Article 235 provides a residual basis for action by al-
lowing the Council of Ministers to take "appropriate meas-
ures" if action by the Community is necessary to attain one
of its objectives and the EEC Treaty does not provide the
necessary powers.36
export policy and measures to protect trade such as those to be taken in
case of dumping and subsidies." The full scope of the EEC's broad pow-
ers under article 113 remains "undetermined and controversial" because
the term "common commercial policy" is not defined in the Treaty of
Rome. Schwarze, Towards a European Foreign Policy - Legal Aspects, in To-
WARDS A EUROPEAN FOREIGN POLIcY 69, 71 (J.K. de Vree, P. Coffey, R.H.
Lauwaars eds. 1987).
35. Kuyper notes the "Council's traditional theory that the goal of the
measure concerned determines whether it falls under the common com-
mercial policy .. " Kuyper, supra note 31, at 143. See Schwarze, supra
note 34, at 72. For example, Kuyper concludes that the European Com-
munity declined to rely on article 113 of the EEC Treaty, but instead chose
article 224 of the EEC Treaty to impose sanctions against Rhodesia in
1966 and 1968 because of the Community's concern that the trade sanc-
tions called for by the United Nations against Rhodesia were "primarily of
a political and security nature" and, therefore, were not within the Com-
munity's competence as delineated in article 2 of the EEC Treaty. Kuyper,
supra note 31, at 143.
Kuyper, however, believes that the process leading to the decision to
impose sanctions under article 113 also can be viewed as part of article
224 framework of consultation. Id. at 148. Article 224 provides:
Member States shall consult each other with a view to taking
together the steps needed to prevent the functioning of the com-
mon market being affected by measures which a Member State
may be called upon to take in the event of serious internal distur-
bances affecting the maintenance of law and order, in the event of
war or serious international tension constituting a threat of war,
or in order to carry out obligations it has accepted for the pur-
pose of maintaining peace and international security.
EEC Treaty, supra note 26, art. 224.
36. Article 235 provides:
If action by the Community should prove necessary to attain,
in the course of the operation of the common market, one of the
objectives of the Community and this Treaty has not provided the
necessary powers, the Council shall, acting unanimously on a
proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assem-
bly, take the appropriate measures.
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Recent sanctions illustrate the Community's approach.
In March 1982, the Community reduced the level of certain
imports from the Soviet Union to protest events in Poland. 7
The action was taken by a regulation pursuant to article 113
of the EEC Treaty.3 8
When Argentina seized the Falkland Islands in the
spring of 1982, the British not only responded with military
force, but also imposed extensive economic sanctions, in-
cluding a freeze on Argentine assets. For the most part
other Member States resorted to import sanctions. The Eu-
ropean Community Council unanimously decided in April
1982 to impose a temporary import ban on Argentine prod-
ucts through a regulation also made pursuant to article
113.3 9 Although some loopholes in the ban diminished its
immediate impact, 40 the Council decision and its basis were
correctly viewed as an important precedent for handling fu-
ture crises. 4 1
In 1986, after unsuccessfully encouraging South Africa
to take certain steps to ameliorate its apartheid system, the
Foreign Ministers of the Member States agreed on several
EEC Treaty, supra note 26, art. 235.
In a major article, Prof. Jurgen Schwarze analyzes the EEC's external
activities within the alternative framework of the European Political Coop-
eration (hereinafter EPO). Schwarze, supra note 34. He describes the EPC
as a "extra-Community consultative mechanism in the area of foreign rela-
tions..... [Despite] various organisational and institutional links to the
Community, legally speaking, the EPC is a strictly intergovernmental co-
operation mechanism and thus stands outside the Community's legal sys-
tem." I at 75. Schwarze adds that: "The European foreign policy of
today is conducted with two different legal systems. (EEC Treaty and
EPG). Although there are fundamental legal differences in theory and na-
ture it is often difficult to define the different foreign policy matters in
practice. There are many links and overlappings to be noticed. Under the
present legal system a clear distinction especially between foreign com-
mercial policy matters of the Treaty (Art. 113) and European foreign polit-
ical affairs of the EPC, often seems impossible." Id. at 78-79.
37. See Kuyper, supra note 31, at 141.
38. Council Reg. (EEC) No. 596/82, 25 O.J. EUR. CoMM. (No. L 72) 15
(1982).
39. See Council Reg. (EEC) No. 877/82, 25 O.J. EUR. Co. M. (No. L
102) 1 (1982).
40. For example, the embargo exempted contracts concluded prior to
the April 16 effective date of the EEC decision. See id. art. 2.
41. See, e.g., Hein, supra note 4, at 408-09; Kuyper. supra note 31. at
147-51.
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measures, including a ban on the import of gold coins, iron,
and steel. 42 The regulation prohibiting the importation of
gold coins was made pursuant to article 113. 4 3 South Afri-
can iron and steel products were banned by a Council Deci-
sion made under the European Coal and Steel Community
Treaty,44 which governs the competence of the European
Community over such products, rather than under article
113 of the EEC Treaty.
Although the European Community has not made ex-
tensive use of export controls for foreign policy purposes, it
does appear to have some power to impose them. For in-
stance, in 1980 the Community imposed an embargo on the
sale of arms to Iran, to be implemented individually by each
Member State pursuant to article 223 of the EEC Treaty.45
Article 223 is narrow in scope, however, dealing with na-
tional security issues such as "trade in arms, munitions and
war material." Nevertheless, a case might be made that
"common commercial policy" specifically includes export
policy given the language of article 110 of the EEC Treaty,
and hence, that article 113 is also available as a legal basis for
export controls. Furthermore, articles 224 and 235 are not
specifically limited to import controls and may also extend to
export controls.
Similarly, the European Community may have some
power to impose controls over private credit. In addition to
articles 224 and 235, articles 67 through 73 of the EEC
Treaty give the Community considerable authority over capi-
tal movements. In the case of South Africa, the European
42. See Council Reg. (EEC) No. 3302/86, 29 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
305) 11 (1986). The regulation exempted "import documents issued and
contracts concluded before the entry into force of this Regulation." Id.
art. 2.
43. Id.
44. Council Decision 86/459/ECSC, 29 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. L 268) 1
(1986). No specific article of the ESCS Treaty was cited. As with the regu-
lation on gold coins, there is a contract sanctity provision. The ban will
affect imports that have been worth about $424 million per year. 3 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1123, 1124 (Sept. 17, 1986).
Article 71 of the ECSC Treaty reserves to Member States the author-
ity for commercial policy for coal and steel products. Article 113 of the
EEC Treaty has not absorbed this reservation. See Louis, supra note 26, at
38.
45. Kuyper, supra note 31, at 145.
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Community Council implemented a ban on new direct in-
vestment in that country.4 6 This could be viewed as a con-
trol on the export of capital, or as a restriction on capital
movements. The Council directive banning new South Afri-
can investments specifically cited article 235, the residual
provision discussed above. Moreover, in the memorandum
from the Commission to the Council proposing the directive,
the definition of new direct investment is based on an earlier
directive that implemented article 67 of the EEC Treaty,
which deals with capital movements. 47 This blending of arti-
des 67 and 235 makes the South African directive a possible
precedent for future export or credit controls. 48
D. Japan
The Japanese Government has been hesitant to impose
economic sanctions for foreign policy purposes, 49 but it has
the power to employ them when necessary. Although the
Japanese Government lacks the extensive, explicit statutory
powers of the governments in the United Kingdom and West
Germany, particularly over exports, it relies on its economic
control legislation as the basis for its authority to impose
sanctions and on "administrative guidance" as the primary
means for their implementation. This guidance encom-
passes a range of measures by which the various government
ministries are able to influence voluntary compliance by pri-
vate entities.50
Two statutes are central to the ministries' authority to
46. Council Dec. No. 86/517/EEC, 29 O.J. EUR. COMt. (No. L 305) 45
(1986).
47. Proposal for a Council Directive Suspending New Direct Invest-
ment in the Republic of South Africa by Residents of the Community.
COM(86) 522 final, Sept. 24, 1986, at 2.
48. Since capital movements are differentiated in articles 67-73 of (he
EEC Treaty, it seems that the directive is a better precedent for future
controls on capital.
49. This hesitancy reflects Japan's dependence on international trade
and its post-World War II policy of avoiding diplomatic disputes.
50. For an overview ofJapanese laws regulating international trade and
credit, see generally Matsushita, Japan and the inplementation of the Tokyo
Round Results [hereinafter Matsushita, Japan], inJ.JAcKsoN, J.V. Louis &
M. MATSUSHrTA, supra note 4, at 77, 89-97; Smith, The Japanese Foreign Ev-
change and Foreign Trade Control Law and Administrative Guidance: The Laby-
rinth and the Castle, 16 LAw & POL'Y I'rr.L Bus. 417 (1984).
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control foreign transactions. The first, the Foreign Ex-
change and Foreign Trade Control Law (hereinafter
FECL),5' permits the relevant ministry to prohibit or restrict
transactions involving the import or export of goods or in-
volving foreign exchange or investment.
Although the FECL gives Japanese ministries broad dis-
cretion, its purpose is limited to economic objectives. 5 2
Moreover, the FECL even recognizes a freedom to export.
Article 47 provides: "Export of goods from Japan shall be
permitted with the minimum restrictions thereon consistent
with the purpose of this Law." 5 3 Indeed, in a rare judicial
challenge to ministerial authority, the Tokyo District Court
in 1969 held that Japanese enforcement of export controls
pursuant to an agreement with its allies on the Consulative
Group Coordination Committee (hereinafter CoCom) 54 was
outside the scope of the FECL and unlawfully intruded upon
the constitutional right to export. 55 This CoCom case and
the FELC's recognition of a citizen's freedom to export sug-
gest that the Government's power to control exports may be
more limited than its power to control imports.56
The second statute, the Export and Import Transactions
51. Gaikokukawase oyobi gaikokuboeki kanri ho, Law No. 228 of 1949,
as amended.
52. Article 1 provides:
This Law has as its objective the sound development of the
national economy together with the balance of international pay-
ments and currency stabilization, taking as its basic tenet the lib-
eralization of foreign exchange, foreign trade, and other foreign
transactions, based on the minimum restrictions necessary for the
control or regulation of foreign transactions, to further the nor-
mal development of foreign transactions.
Transl. in Matsushita, Japan, supra note 50, at 134 n.42.
53. Id. at 90.
54. The CoCom was created in 1949 by the United States and six Euro-
pean allies to coordinate efforts to block many exports to communist
countries. CoCom was expanded in 1952-1953 and now includes Japan
and all NATO allies except Iceland and Spain. For a discussion of
CoCom, see generally Hunt, Mullilateral Cooperation in Export Controls-The
Role of CoCom, 14 U. TOL. L. REV. 1285 (1983).
55. See Matsushita,Japan, supra note 50, at 91; Matsushita, Export Control
and Export Cartels in Japan, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 103, 106-08 (1979) (citing
Pekin-Shanhai Nihon Kogyo Tenrankai v. Nihon, 20 Gyosei Reishu 842
(Tokyo Dist. Ct. 1969)).
56. Matsushita,Japan, supra note 50, at 94-95.
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Law (hereinafter Transactions Law), 57 grants the Ministry of
International Trade and Industry (hereinafter MITI) broad
authority over private export and import agreements. If
MITI believes that any of these agreements might produce
results that are harmful to the Japanese economy, MITI can
set export prices and quantities, or issue orders that limit im-
ports.5 8 Like the FECL, the Transaction Law is also limited
to economic objectives.
The restrictions to economic purpose expressed in the
FECL and the Transactions Law do not, however, prevent
the Government from controlling exports, imports, and pri-
vate credit for non-economic foreign policy reasons. The
plaintiffs in the CoCom case were denied recovery because
they failed to prove that MITI imposed the export controls
maliciously or negligently.5 9 Moreover, this 1969 case is the
only "successful" legal challenge to MITI's attempts to con-
trol foreign trade for foreign policy reasons, and Japan con-
tinues to participate with its allies in the CoCom.
Much of the Japanese Government's ability to use eco-
nomic sanctions is because many of the controls of MITI are
imposed through "administrative guidance," rather than
specific legal authority. In Japan, administrative guidance,
often of an informal variety, is a primary means of govern-
ment regulation. 60 In the area of foreign trade regulation,
for example, MITI has used administrative guidance to in-
duce Japanese exporters to comply with voluntary restraint
agreements made with the United States. In these cases,
MITI threatened to invoke its authority under the Transac-
tions Law to fix prices and quantities, but was able to achieve
compliance without having to do so.61
Japanese ministries have also used administrative gui-
dance to expand their authority under the FECL. For exam-
ple, under the statute, most foreign commercial transactions
do not require prior ministerial approval, but do require
prior notification to the "relevant" ministry. 62 The minis-
57. Yushutsunyu torihiki ho, Law No. 299 of 1952, as amended.
58. Id. arts. 28 (exports), 7-2(l) and 30(l) (imports); see Matsushita,ja-
pan, supra note 50, at 92-93, 96.
59. Matsushita,Japan, supra note 50, at 94-95.
60. See Smith, supra note 50, at 418-20.
61. Matsushita,Japan, supra note 50, at 93-94.
62. Smith, supra note 50, at 425.
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tries have designated the Bank of Japan as the governmental
entity to receive the notification documents required under
the FECL and to determine which ministry has jurisdiction
over the transaction. 63 As a result, a party usually must con-
sult with the Bank even before submitting any documents.
In addition, if the relevant ministry objects to the proposed
transaction as it is initially submitted by a party, it may "in-
formally decline to formally accept" a party's documenta-
tion.64 In this way, ministries may express their initial disap-
proval and then negotiate with a party rather than having to
prohibit officially an unfavored transaction. 65
A party has incentives to heed the administrative gui-
dance from the ministries because their favor is likely to be
needed later. The ministries have been known to retaliate
against uncooperative companies in unrelated areas.60
Thus, well before the party has submitted documents or the
ministry has taken official action, an informal approval pro-
cess is underway, and the legal steps that follow are usually
pro forma.67
Using its statutory authority and administrative gui-
63. Id. at 428.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 427-32.
66. Id. at 426.
67. Id. at 431-32. As an example of the result, in the specific area of
private credit, Japan appears to coordinate its foreign policy closely with
its large private banks. This reflects both an extension of the domestic
economic and political relationships in Japan and the importance to it of
international trade and finance. J. SPINDLER, supra note 20, at 114-34;
Spindler, The Growing Entanglement of International Banking and Foreign Polic,
8 TRANSATL. PERSP., May 1983, at 3, 4.
There are also specific government incentive programs. For example,
MITI administers and underwrites export insurance covering many com-
mercial and political risks. These include essentially all risks incurred by
Japanese banks as a result of a foreign buyer's default. Noncommercial
considerations regularly affect decisions on the allocation of insurance.
During the early 1980s, MITI insurance covered more than 40%o of all
Japanese exports. In contrast, the guarantee and insurance programs of
the U.S. Eximbank were equivalent to roughly 37o of U.S. exports for
1981. J. SPINDLER, supra note 20, at 122-23.
Possibly even more important, the continuing and frequent adminis-
trative guidance by the Japanese Government "has given the government
a highly effective means of informally influencingJapanese banks' overseas
business behavior." Id. at 134.
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dance, the Japanese Government has shown itself capable of
imposing economic sanctions for foreign policy reasons. For
example, despite extensive economic ties with Iran, Japan
did take some mild steps against that country in 1979 during
the American hostage crisis. Japan agreed not to buy Iranian
oil on the spot market and to hold its total imports of Iranian
oil to pre-hostage levels.68 In response to the Soviet inva-
sion of Afghanistan, Japan in 1980 restricted both credit to
the Soviet Union and its export of capital machinery and
high technology.69 In September 1986Japan prohibited new
contracts for the purchase of iron and steel from South Af-
rica until the South African Government "demonstrates its
concrete will to abolish apartheid." 70
III. CONCLUSION
In short, although comparisons between countries and
their legal systems should always be undertaken with cau-
don, the preceding observations suggest that present U.S.
laws are not necessarily the only, or even the best, approach
68. See Yoshitu, Iran and Afghanistan in Japanese Perspective. 21 Asian
SURV. 501 (May 1981). Japan, however, refused to give up the Iran-Japan
Petrochemical Company, a $2 billion capital investment forJapan that was
85% complete in 1980, and did not place any controls on its banks, which
helped Iran circumvent the U.S. freeze on Iranian assets. Id. at 504-05.
69. Japan also boycotted the Moscow Olympics and limited the cx-
change of trade personnel. Kerns, An Outfall in the East, FAR. E. ECON.
REv., July 24, 1986, at 43.
As a result of Japan's economic sanctions, it slipped from being the
Soviets' second largest non-communist trading partner (after West Ger-
many) to being its fifth largest. Business pressures led Japan to gradually
ease its sanctions. Id.
By December 1981, when President Reagan called for more sanctions
against the Soviet Union because of the political situation in Poland,japan
limited itself to largely symbolic gestures, such as the cancellation of some
trade meetings between Soviet and Japanese officials. Japan opposed the
U.S. export prohibitions on oil and gas equipment and techology, which
threatened to delay a major Japanese-Soviet oil and gas project. Id.
70. Wash. Post, Sept. 20, 1986, at A16, col. 1. Japan also approved
three other steps which were largely symbolic. These included a "confir-
mation" of the lack of air service between the two countries by their na-
tional airlines, curbs on tourism, and a cutback in the use by japanese offi-
cials of South African airways. Id.; N.Y. Times, Sept. 19, 1986, at A3, col.
4.
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for resorting to economic sanctions for foreign policy pur-
poses.
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